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At its core, this essay contains a substanti-
ated plea for bringing about conceptual 
clarity to the notion of “Muslim intellec-
tual,” which the frequent and highly ideo-
logically charged public usage of this term 
seems to distort. In search for a sound 
analytical concept of “intellectual” first, 
relevant sociological and philosophical 
deliberations are highlighted, indicating 
that both of their notions differ to such an 
extent that their applicability to academic 
pursuit must be doubted. Yet, by discuss-
ing some considerations by a study of 
Islam open to the approaches of the so-
cial sciences a possible framework for an 
analytically meaningful concept of “Mus-
lim intellectual” is presented. At the same 
time, however, arguments are presented 
for why those contemporary Muslim think-
ers who are usually credited with being 
“Muslim intellectuals” would hardly fit the 
analytical criteria for such label. 1
These days, numerous terms, concepts, 
and labels bustle about in the popu-
lar media, impacting not just the com-
mon mind, but also academic discourse. 
This development is quite alarming, as 
it causes widely accepted rules of aca-
demic speech (e.g. Popper 1, 16-9, 22-5) to 
become infested with heavily value-laden 
and pithily used terms. This seems to be 
even more the case in the current highly 
emotionally charged media coverage of 
Islam- and Middle East-related develop-
ments in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, which were justified on the basis 
of religion. To illustrate this rather troubling 
situation:
Recently, the terms salafī, salafiyya, Salaf-
ist, and Salafism have been flying around 
the media, labeling a quite heteroge-
neous group of Muslims who stand out 
visibly in their attempts to strictly adhere 
to the beliefs and, beyond that, the prac-
tices of earlier generations of believers. In 
the public perception, the term salafī has 
become representative of someone who, 
on religious grounds, rejects all values 
upon which the overwhelming majority 
of contemporary societies are based (lib-
eral, democratic, secular, etc.). This rather 
woolly notion of salafī has now entered the 
academic context without, in most cases, 
being subjected to thorough scholarly 
scrutiny.2 This is regrettable for several rea-
sons. Firstly, such a lack of conceptual clar-
ity lumps those reform-inclined Muslims 
in Egypt and the Levant at the turn of the 
twentieth century, who have explicitly la-
beled themselves as “salafiyya”, alongside 
various contemporary groups and person-
alities that range from the state-supportive 
religious establishment in Saudi Arabia to 
militant manifestations such as al-Qāʿida. 
Secondly, the absence of a clearly defined 
analytical term will render every deduc-
tion on this basis at least problematic, if 
not void.
A similar label originating perhaps more 
in popular speech is that of the “Muslim 
intellectual,” the subject of the present pa-
per. Hardly ever properly defined, this tag 
appears to be ascribed to those Muslims 
who, by emphasizing rationality over slav-
ishly adhering to a textual tradition, sup-
port the general compatibility of Western 
and Islamic social and political values. In 
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short, the badges “salafis” and “intellectu-
als” represent the “bad guys” and “good 
guys,” respectively, from a perspective 
clearly shaped in a Western normative 
framework.
In this paper I will attempt to abstain from 
this popular notion of intellectual, instead 
considering it as an analytical term that has 
some explanatory force in academic pur-
suit. In doing so, I will generally challenge 
the idea of religiously connoted intellectu-
alism, but conclude that the concept—pro-
vided it has been usefully defined—might 
be analytically effective for understanding 
social and intellectual change in the Mus-
lim world during the decades around the 
turn of the twentieth century.
Three Approaches to the Target
In my attempt to ascribe meaning to the 
category intellectual in general, and Mus-
lim intellectual in particular, I will elaborate 
three rather distinct approaches that have 
so far contributed significantly to the dis-
cussion, while at the same time not being 
necessarily in line with each other. The 
reasons for this disagreement are most 
probably of a systematic nature, rooted 
in the very self-conception of the respec-
tive academic disciplines. While sociol-
ogy since Weber aims at interpretatively 
understanding actual social realities, prac-
tical philosophy—though related to social 
realities—seeks to attain a rational justifica-
tion of normative frameworks. Although it 
appears that both perspectives are mutu-
ally exclusive and would, therefore, require 
us to decide which of the two we are going 
to follow, both indeed have something to 
offer to our quest—especially with regard 
to the question of whether it makes sense 
to place intellectualism within an authori-
tatively grounded setting. In other words, 
it may help us to consider the usefulness 
of a category Muslim intellectual, as dis-
tinct from Christian intellectual, Buddhist 
intellectual, Marxist intellectual, liberalist 
intellectual, and the like, or whether the 
adherence to such a framework somehow 
contradicts the very idea of intellectualism. 
Finally, I will demonstrate that a study of 
Islam which is open to the insights of the 
social sciences and other humanities has 
something constructive to contribute to 
our academic discussion on the topic.
a) The Sociological Approach
While a distinct branch has developed 
within sociology investigating the phe-
nomenon of the “intellectual,”3 the indi-
vidual to whom we owe the first systematic 
discussion on this matter was, as is so often 
the case, Max Weber. He had considered 
intellectuals within his sociology of domi-
nation (Herrschaftssoziologie) by defining 
them as:
those who wield power in the polity … 
the intellectuals, as we shall tentatively 
call those who usurp leadership in a Kul-
turgemeinschaft (that is, within a group 
of people who by virtue of their pecu-
liarity, have access to certain products 
that are considered “culture goods”) … 
(Weber 530 [transl. Talcott Parsons; ital-
ics in the original])
What can be extracted from this most gen-
eral definition of “intellectuals” is inner-
worldliness, or the assumption of public 
responsibilities, as a decisive criterion (see 
Shils, “Intellectuals and Powers”; Tradition 
and Modernity). As such, Weber expert 
Wolfgang Schluchter has argued, intellec-
tuals do not only have access to “cultural 
assets,” but are decisively involved in the 
production of “cultural values”—values that, 
in turn, either relate to culture and society, 
or neutralize it (Schluchter 1:122, 2:533 f). 
“Culture-related values” are ethical values, 
ideally explicitly shaped by pragmatic or 
situation-depended considerations, while 
“culture-neutralizing values” are those pro-
duced by theoretical considerations and 
proclaimed as spatially and temporally in-
variant “truths.” In a disenchanted world, 
Weber and his epigones would argue, 
the latter values originate in the natural 
sciences and are declared paradigmatic 
by modern “intellectuals” carried away by 
progress; it is this very declaration of val-
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ues as self-evident, i.e. free from any social 
and cultural context, that the French cul-
tural philosopher Julien Benda (d. 1956) 
would eventually unveil as the “betrayal 
of the intellectuals.” This will be discussed 
below.
However, both sets of values that, accord-
ing to Schluchter, intellectuals produce 
in the disenchanted world have a clear 
equivalent within a pre-modern religious 
framework as religious ethics and meta-
physics. This, in turn, suggests the exis-
tence of “religious intellectuals” as the pro-
ducers of these values, a fact that Weber 
and those in his wake are ready to concede 
(see Weber 304-14; Eisenstadt 29-39 et pas-
sim; Schluchter 1:223, 2:178, 206-10, 450f). 
Authors like Schluchter even go so far as 
to equate “clerics” with religious intellectu-
als, as those who “usually produce religious 
dogmas” (ibid. 1:223 and who are distinct 
from religiously motivated “lay intellectuals” 
(ibid.). This notion has a number of short-
comings. Firstly, it only works for communi-
ties in possession of a formal clerical estate, 
which renders it inapplicable in the Muslim 
context. Secondly, it is very much the pro-
duction of dogmas—even those derived by 
the exertion of rational efforts—that leads 
ultimately to conflict with a philosophical 
concept of “intellectual,” even though so-
ciologists like Edward Shils (d. 1995) seem 
to have somehow tried in their works (e.g., 
“Intellectuals and Powers”; Tradition and 
Modernity) on the matter to overcome this 
antagonism.
b) The Philosophical Approach
Hardly any thinkers other than afore-men-
tioned Frenchman Julien Benda repre-
sented the philosophical position toward 
intellectuals at the fin de siècle. As was 
the case for many other educated French, 
and even more so for him as an assimilat-
ed Jew, the “Dreyfus Affair” of 1894 along 
with the inglorious role that numerous self-
proclaimed intellectuals played therein 
became a catalyst for Benda’s influential 
view on intellectuals, presented for the 
first time in his La Trahison des clercs in 
1927. Benda initially set out the role of in-
tellectuals as devoted, in an interest-free 
spirit, to guarding static universals such as 
“truth,” “justice,” “freedom,” and “reason,” 
only to unmask them as having quietly 
abandoned their lofty claim and allowing 
themselves to become corrupted by spe-
cial interests (Trahison 83-92). However, 
instead of publicly acknowledging what 
Benda has labeled as this “betrayal,” intel-
lectuals disguise it by claiming their posi-
tions to be guided by insight into an “ob-
jective necessity”—or, as Benda has called 
it, “in the name of a [mystical] union with 
the evolution of the world” (ibid. 37). This 
insight into an objective—though defined—
necessity is, for Benda, a declaration of the 
bankruptcy of reason as the defining prin-
ciple of intellectualism: since reason was 
subordinated to external circumstances 
that are declared inevitable, it became 
degraded to a mere tool for the affirma-
tion and aggrandizement of an existing or-
der and preconceived developments, and 
hence, solely as a means of legitimizing 
dogma. According to Benda, adherence to 
dogma is diametrically opposed to intel-
lectual pursuit; in this point he implicitly 
re-invokes the idealist critique of empiri-
cism at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
which has hardly been brought more to 
the point than in the remarks of the other-
wise rather reviled Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(d. 1814). Already in his Attempt at a New 
Presentation of the Science of Knowledge 
from 1797/8, Fichte had defined a “dog-
matist” in very much the way Benda had 
portrayed the fraudulent intellectual, when 
he wrote:
Every consistent dogmatist must nec-
essarily be a fatalist. He does not deny, 
as a fact of consciousness, that we con-
sider ourselves to be free; indeed it 
would be quite unreasonable to deny 
this. Instead, he uses his own principle 
to prove the falsity of this claim. He re-
jects the self-sufficiency of the I, which 
the idealist takes as his fundamental 
explanatory ground, and he treats the I 
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merely as a product of things; i.e., as an 
accidental feature of the world. A con-
sistent dogmatist is also necessarily a 
materialist (1:430-31).
What we may conclude from this is that, 
for Fichte, an acceptance of any kind of 
dogma—as an indisputable truth exist-
ing outside ourselves—renders the ulti-
mate task of an intellectual, specifically 
the production of culture-related values, 
completely void. Thus, we may conclude 
from both Fichte and Benda, to be an in-
tellectual requires an uncompromising 
commitment to values that transcend the 
narrow confines of any dogma, rendering 
it a particular personal disposition:
The kind of philosophy one chooses 
thus depends upon the kind of person 
one is. For a philosophical system is not 
a lifeless household item one can put 
aside or pick up as one wishes; instead, 
it is animated by the very soul of the 
person who adopts it. Someone whose 
character is naturally slack and who has 
been enervated and twisted by spiritu-
al servitude, scholarly self-indulgence, 
and vanity will never be able to raise 
himself to the level of idealism (Fichte 
1:434).
Fichte himself, as Benda argued in a lat-
er work, was such an intellectual: it was 
more the idea of national unity advocated 
by him and like-minded thinkers than the 
German Customs Union (Deutscher Zoll-
verein) which eventually brought about 
the German nation (Discours 17). In other 
words, it was first and foremost intellectu-
als who brought about the novel idea of a 
nation as a culture-related value, and not 
any external condition portrayed as inevi-
table that necessitated the establishment 
of that nation.
What can be concluded from this brief ex-
cursion into a philosophical approach to 
the concept of intellectual for our own criti-
cal investigation is that, at least from this 
perspective, religion and intellectualism 
are mutually exclusive. This, in turn, poses 
the question of whether it is meaningful to 
speak of “Muslim intellectuals” or indeed, 
of a “Christian intellectual,” a “Buddhist in-
tellectual,” and so on. Here, we would have 
to ask whether the attribute that refers to 
the belonging to a certain religious com-
munity is indeed the defining criterion for 
a particular brand of intellectuals. From the 
viewpoint of philosophers like the staunch 
Lutheran Fichte and the acculturated Jew 
Benda, a person can only be an “intellect-
ual” if her or his religious belonging does 
not impact the rational argument for or 
against cultural values in a dogmatic man-
ner. If this is the case, then the attribute 
that signifies religious belonging becomes 
more or less redundant; it would then be 
as significant a definiens as “bespectacled 
intellectual” or “bearded intellectual.” If, 
in any case, the religious proclivities of a 
person become so dominant that religious 
dogma becomes the crucial reference 
point for the justification of cultural val-
ues, then according to our philosophers, 
such a person can by definition not be an 
intellectual.
Be that as it may, a sensible compromise 
between this prescriptive philosophical 
notion of intellectual and the more socio-
logical one with regards to the Muslim 
context can be elaborated from the in-
triguing considerations of controversial 
Islamicist Reinhard Schulze (b. 1953), who 
has proposed a differentiation between 
“scholars” (ʿulamāʾ, sg. ʿālim) and “intel-
lectuals” (mufakkirūn) in order to better 
understand profound structural changes 
in the Muslim world since the late nine-
teenth century.
c) The Approach by a Social Science-
Inclined Study of Islam
Schulze proposes to employ the category 
intellectual in order to better understand 
what he calls ”the historical function of an 
‘Enlightenment process’—that is, the libera-
tion of an intellectual and academic culture 
within a society from immediate commit-
ment to the directly experienced domina-
tion (Herrschaftsbindung) of an ancien 
régime” (Schulze, Internationalismus 3). 
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Therefore, for him, intellectuals comprise 
a new social group that a) does not affirm 
prevalent political rule, rather considering 
itself as the most suitable for community 
leadership; b) formulates a general social 
interest that is solely rooted in the profound 
knowledge of its own society; and c) would 
eventually claim a monopoly of definition 
in evaluating the state of the society and 
devising political remedies (ibid.). What 
should be quite obvious is that here, Schul-
ze is certainly not concerned with any pre-
modern period, but rather with the rapid 
and profound structural changes that have 
commonly been used to define modernity 
(Habermas, Diskurs 9-33; Hübinger 304-7). 
These very changes are what caused the 
emergence of a new societal elite; this 
elite, in turn, would then seriously question 
existing social and political conditions and, 
moreover, the knowledge that was used to 
justify its existence. While the ultimate tar-
get of this new social elite was therefore 
the political establishment, it first needed 
to challenge those who were engaged in 
the production and administration of he-
gemonic knowledge (Herrschaftswissen)—
that is, the ʿulamāʾ.
Over the centuries, the ʿ ulamāʾ had estab-
lished firm criteria for what was considered 
knowledge, or “acquaintance with tradi-
tion”4 (ʿilm), as well as the methods for its 
acquisition. The ultimate premise herein 
is that knowledge cannot actually be pro-
duced, only reproduced: the focal point re-
mains the authoritative texts and, first and 
foremost, those believed to be God’s final 
verbal revelation to humanity in the Qurʾan. 
Such a strict dependence on text served 
to prevent free speculation (raʾy), since the 
foundation for any intellectual pursuit re-
mained ultimately indisputable. It is upon 
this basis that, over time, exegetical tradi-
tions emerged which developed a number 
of genuine tools for controlling the perpet-
uation of knowledge. One of them is the in-
stitution of the formal teaching permission 
(ijāza) that contains the authoritative chain 
of transmission (sanad) and, thus, links its 
recipient all the way back to the Prophet 
Muhammad as the most authoritative in-
terpreter of the divine revelation. As an-
other of these tools, one may consider the 
formally rather restricted process of com-
menting upon earlier works that, at some 
point, have assumed an almost canonical 
status. It can certainly be argued that these 
formal restrictions—represented, among 
others, by the three forms sharḥ (i.e., com-
mentary proper), ḥāshiya (glosses) and 
hāmish (marginal annotation)—indicate the 
confines within which individual reasoning 
can be tolerated, and where there must be 
no provision for irreversible breaks with the 
exegetical tradition.
Schulze identifies two developments that, 
in his eyes, contributed significantly to the 
undermining of the monopoly of definition 
held by the ʿulamāʾ since the eighteenth 
century. However, more recent scholarship 
has convincingly shown that the impact of 
one of these developments, namely the 
emergence of a new type of Sufism labeled 
Neo-Sufism, has been rather exaggerated 
(Schulze, Internationalismus 18-26).5 The 
importance of the other development, 
essentially a technological and economic 
one, need hardly be explained: its trig-
ger was the final implementation of the 
printed word across the Muslim world, 
and the resulting mass production of liter-
ary materials (ibid. 27-32; idem, “Printing” 
41-9). That this development constituted a 
serious threat to the ʿulamāʾ ’s monopoly 
of definition is already evident from their 
arguments against the establishment of an 
Ottoman printing press under the super-
vision of the Hungarian convert to Islam 
Ibrahim Müteferrika (d. 1158/1745) in the 
early 1720s, even though the latter had de-
veloped a clear religious legal framework 
for his arguments in support of the print-
ed word (Reichmuth 157-60).6 However, 
the ultimate precondition for a successful 
implementation of the printed word was 
the existence of a newly emerged reader-
ship outside the space controlled by the 
ʿulamāʾ. Quite similar to developments 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
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Europe (Habermas, Strukturwandel 69-
85), a self-confident and educated public 
emerged, primarily amongst the ascend-
ing mercantile class, which demanded a 
new kind of cultural good. These goods 
did not necessarily relate in an affirmative 
manner to the existing political establish-
ment, but instead to the economic interest 
of this new social strata.
The establishment of printing presses from 
Istanbul to Calcutta in the early nineteenth 
century, sanctioned by the political ruler 
but set up mostly by daring entrepreneurs, 
brought into play a new criterion for the 
selection of texts-to-be-printed, one not 
overseen by the ʿulamāʾ: namely, market-
ability. Now, the court was not the only 
customer for literary products beyond the 
scholarly estate; increasingly, the interests 
and literary tastes of the new and ever-
growing educated public—considered 
by numerous scholars to be the nucleus 
for the emergence of a bourgeoisie (e.g. 
Schulze, “Gräber” 773-77; Pernau passim)—
needed to be catered to. Because these 
interests and tastes hardly overlapped with 
those of the ʿulamāʾ, both social groups 
occupied distinct social and also physical 
spaces for their respective production of 
cultural goods, leading to the eventual 
embodiment of distinct cultural values. 
The ʿulamāʾ remained in the highly regu-
lated space of the religious seminary—the 
madrasa or the dār al-ʿulūm—and in the 
mosque, where works were meticulously 
copied by students under the vigilant eye 
of a senior scholar, and where the discus-
sion circles (majālis) were always rather 
teacher-centered. Religious dogma, the 
epitome of ʿilm, continued to be the cul-
tural good produced in these spaces.
In contrast, the newly emerging social stra-
ta resorted to using spaces that initially had 
a much different general function: at first, 
its members frequented informal places 
outside the cities, but from the eighteenth 
century on they congregated in what might 
be considered the “profane space” of cof-
fee houses, and the salons that developed 
in private residencies (Schulze, “Gräber” 
764-76).7 It was in these alternative spaces 
(maqāʿid) that a less-restrictive ethos of 
discussion surrounding cultural values—
embedded in science, literature and even 
theology—developed between people 
from various, although almost exclusively 
innerworldly, backgrounds. Beyond the 
knowledge the ʿulamāʾ brought forth, 
ideas (afkār) were developed and dis-
cussed; their carriers consequently known 
as mufakkirūn—intellectuals, who in the Ot-
toman lands became known as “afandiyya.” 
What is interesting is that the topics that 
the intellectuals debated appear, at least 
at first glance, strikingly similar to those 
around which the discourse of the ʿ ulamāʾ 
revolved. However, a closer look reveals 
that the reference points for the groups 
were significantly different. While it is in-
deed the case that both groups were con-
cerned with notions of “justice,” “freedom,” 
or “politics” (idem, Internationalismus 33-
6), the ʿulamāʾ remained clearly within the 
confines of the Qurʾanic revelation and 
the Islamic exegetical tradition. Hence, 
“justice” (ʿadl) is discussed in the context 
of the juxtaposition of divine and human 
capacities, “freedom” rather critically as 
epistemological and the resulting action-
theoretical concept of “freedom of choice” 
(ikhtiyār), and “politics” in correlation with 
the revealed framework as “good gover-
nance” (siyāsat al-sharʿiyya). Even with re-
gard to “society,” the reference point is not 
so much the actual society in which these 
ʿulamāʾ lived and functioned, but rather 
the highly-idealized concept of a “com-
munity of believers” (umma islāmiyya). 
The mufakkirūn, in contrast, although 
equally referring to an idealized universal-
istic framework, their ideas of “freedom” 
(ḥurriyya), “justice” (inṣāf), or “politics” 
(siyāsa) related to their own experiences 
within the society in which they lived, and 
hence, were rooted in an appreciation of 
their own relatedness as human beings to 
the empirical world and not—at least not 
necessarily—to a dogmatic framework.
While both groups had perhaps equally 
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good arguments in support of the validity 
of their respective views, it was the printed 
word and the resulting rapid dissemina-
tion of the works of intellectuals—aimed at 
reaching an as-large-as-possible reader-
ship (idem, “Printing” 46)8—that made the 
ultimate difference. However, the triumph 
of the intellectual over the ʿ ālim caused the 
latter to eventually assess and subsequent-
ly rectify its position. It is this adjustment to 
the prevalent circumstances that caused 
the genuine Muslim intellectual to disap-
pear, at least as a useful analytical category.
Like a Shooting Star: The Fading of a 
Category
Admittedly, it took the ʿulamāʾ some time 
to finally recognize the threat that the in-
tellectuals posed to their thus-far hardly 
contested monopoly of definition. How-
ever, once they had realized the gravity 
of their situation, the ʿulamāʾ tackled the 
problem head-on by appropriating issues 
as well as strategies that thus far had been 
exclusive to the intellectuals: their frame 
of reference would become more inner-
worldly, in both content and strategy of 
dissemination. That European colonialism 
abolished Muslim rule across the Muslim 
world helped this transition considerably. 
While the impact and consequences of co-
lonialism cannot but be considered cata-
strophic for the indigenous population, 
it actually helped the ʿulamāʾ to liberate 
themselves from their traditional confines: 
they were no longer required to provide 
a normatively grounded justification for 
actual political rule, and therefore found 
themselves in a situation almost similar to 
that of the emerging intellectuals around 
the eighteenth century. Now ʿulamāʾ left 
the spatial confines of the seminary and 
the mosque and entered with the intel-
lectuals into discussions of culture-relat-
ed values; at the same time, intellectuals 
became increasingly accepted within the 
traditional spaces of ʿulamāʾ hegemony, 
which, in turn, facilitated reforms of cur-
ricula and means of instruction.9 Thus, for 
example, the ijāza—originally only issued 
as a permission to teach one particular 
text in one particular tradition—became a 
certificate for the completion of a course 
in one particular subject, or even of the 
whole course of study (e.g. Hartung 237-
38). It was these processes of mutual “in-
filtration” of formerly distinct and, indeed, 
rather exclusive social spaces that even-
tually blurred the boundaries between 
ʿulamāʾ and mufakkirūn and made an ana-
lytically meaningful distinction increasingly 
difficult. Besides, connected to this opening 
of space was an approximation in the ini-
tially conflicting values that each of the two 
groups had so far monopolized.
Moreover, ʿulamāʾ increasingly subscribed 
to various technical means to publicize and 
circulate their views widely. At the center 
of this was, naturally, the printed word. But 
increasingly, audiovisual media and, more 
recently, the Internet with its many avail-
able formats, have taken hold. While the 
endorsement of the use of these media 
has contributed greatly to the reaching 
out from the confines of seminary and 
mosque, new literary genres were also 
appropriated by the ʿulamāʾ in addition 
to the dissemination of classical religious 
works. These new genres had previously 
been peculiar to the intellectuals: now, 
scholars were also producing popular 
textbooks with religious themes, spiritual 
memoirs, and general (religious) treatises 
on a vast variety of topics, written in a style 
easily digestible by the religious lay audi-
ence—the very same one whose taste the 
mufakkirūn had previously exclusively 
catered to. After the ʿulamāʾ entered into 
the same arena and addressed the same 
issues in a similar fashion, the divide be-
tween them and the mufakkirūn began 
to blur. Soon, the label mufakkir was also 
applied to ʿulamāʾ without any analytical 
distinction, as examples of the South Asian 
ʿālim Abu l-Hasan ʿAli Nadwi (d. 1999) and 
Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) pro-
vide ample evidence for; indeed, this epi-
thet has since even been bestowed upon 
pre-modern thinkers, such as Ibn Taymiyya 
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(d. 1328) or Shah Waliyallah Dihlawi (d. 1762). 
At the same time, self-made men like Indian 
activist Muhammad ʿAli “Jawhar” (d. 1931) 
and Islamist theoretician Abul Aʿla Mawdu-
di (d. 1979) were bestowed the honorific of 
“Mawlānā,” until then reserved solely for 
formally trained ʿulamāʾ. Does this mean 
that the concept of the Muslim intellectual 
has been rendered inapplicable, at least 
as an analytical category with any explana-
tory force? After all, the label is commonly 
assigned to a wide array of contemporary 
Muslim thinkers, like Egyptian Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zayd (d. 2010), Iranian Abdulkarim So-
roush (b. 1945), or Swiss-Egyptian Tariq Ra-
madan (b. 1962), and even academics seem 
hardly to question whether this is an appro-
priate label. Therefore, in conclusion, I will 
briefly outline my doubts regarding whether 
we gain any insight by ascribing the label 
Muslim intellectual to these or similar per-
sons, and argue that the denominational 
attribute actually contradicts the very no-
tion of intellectual.
All three personalities mentioned are not 
products of distinct religious educational 
institutions; but rather, of Western or West-
ernized ones. In addition, they all pursued 
an academic career in the selfsame institu-
tions: Abu Zayd at the Department of Ara-
bic Language and Literature at Cairo Uni-
versity, Soroush at the Institute for Cultural 
Research and Studies at Tehran University, 
and Ramadan initially at the University of 
Fribourg in Switzerland. Thus, their intel-
lectual development seems to predispo-
sition them all as “intellectuals” proper. 
However, the works with which our three 
examples have achieved international rec-
ognition present us with a different picture.
Different as indeed they are, the core of 
the works of all three is indeed constitut-
ed by the unifying project of rationalizing 
religion in order to make it relevant for 
contemporary societies: Thus, while Abu 
Zayd attempted to rationalize the Qurʾanic 
revelation by stressing the historicity of the 
Qurʾanic text, Soroush’s endeavors revolve 
around rationalizing prophecy, and Rama-
dan’s around the development of rational 
arguments for the necessity of a new fiqh, 
taking into consideration especially the fact 
of a growing Muslim presence in Western 
countries (e.g. Abū Zayd 5-7; Sorūsh 1-28; 
Ramadan 93-102). None of them, however, 
question the veracity of the divine revela-
tion as the ultimate foundation in renego-
tiation of societal values, and hence rely 
upon the reality of divinity as the supreme 
authority. By resting all the insights they 
produce on the premise of faith, they do 
not—like Kant did in the late eighteenth 
century—develop the skepticism towards 
the existence of God that is required for 
the recognition of “God” as a regulative 
idea (Kant 2:512-605 [B 595-732]). Thus, 
while Abu Zayd acknowledges the impact 
of a temporally and spatially concrete Arab 
culture (ḥaḍāra) in the linguistic codifica-
tion of the Qurʾan, he does not call into 
question the time- and placelessness of 
God as sender (mursil) and His message 
(risāla) to a temporally and spatially con-
fined humanity as its recipient (mustaqbil) 
(Abū Zayd 31-57 et passim). 
Tariq Ramadan, in turn, attempts to align 
Islamic legal precepts with the secular so-
cio-political framework of those European 
states with a significant Muslim population, 
stressing the crucial importance of inde-
pendent reasoning (ijtihād) in this con-
text. In the process, he proposes a new 
legal-cum-ethical concept of territoriality 
that supplements the classical typology of 
dār al-islām, dār al-ḥarb, dār al-ṣulḥ and 
dār al-ʿahd and aims at providing a frame-
work for Muslims in the West to maintain 
their normatively grounded moral superi-
ority while integrating into the social and 
political structures prevalent in the West 
and contributing to their respective poli-
ties (Ramadan 119-52). Ramadan’s views 
are, even more than those of Abu Zayd, 
based on faith, behind which one must 
not—and, in fact, cannot—go. Moreover, 
Ramadan, who for many is considered the 
“Muslim intellectual” par excellence, does 
not even attempt to view the normative 
foundations of his thought in a critical light.
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The one of our three authors who, in my 
opinion, comes closest to a notion of intel-
lectual is Soroush. He, namely, plays down 
the canonized revelation in the Qurʾan to 
such an extent that it almost fades away 
completely. In contrast, he emphasizes 
the primacy of the historically deter-
mined “prophetic experience” (tajrebah-
ye nabavī) by stressing that humanity is to 
constantly re-experience it and, because 
of the changing circumstances in time, 
expand it (bast kardan) (Sorūsh 12-15 et 
passim). While in this way Soroush clearly 
takes up the cudgel for the autonomy of 
the subject against the primacy of a de-
historicized text, he still seems to assume 
an essence of religion enshrined in the 
manifold perpetuations of Muhammad’s 
experience of a procedural revelation—
which, given the historically changing cir-
cumstances, will necessarily take on differ-
ent shapes.
What we may well conclude from this 
brief survey of the arguments presented 
by three authors who in popular as well 
as academic discourse are widely con-
sidered “Muslim intellectuals,” is that, in 
the light of the lengthy exposition of the 
sociological and, beyond, the philosophi-
cal argument, this categorization does not 
hold water. In fact, the most they could be 
labeled as is “Islamic intellectuals,” refer-
ring to the normative basis on which their 
respective views are based. This, however, 
would be a logical fallacy, since the analyti-
cal concept of the intellectual necessitates 
a critical distance from every faith-based 
supposition. Hence, one may perhaps con-
sider someone like Anglo-Indian dissident 
thinker Ibn Warraq (b. 1946), who disso-
ciates himself from accepting any social 
and ethical value that cannot be justified 
outside the confines of religion (Ibn War-
raq 172-97 et passim), a “Muslim intellec-
tual”—but, again, despite him certainly not 
agreeing to this label (ibid.),10 it would be 
just as analytically meaningful and useful 
for the social sciences as the previously 
mentioned categories of bespectacled 
intellectual or bearded intellectual.
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